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Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies: Lessons from the 
American Experience
Giandomenico Majone, European University Institute, 
Florence
1. The Control Problem in Policy Making
Like all basic questions of democratic theory, controlling 
bureaucratic discretion and enforcing political 
accountability are not problems that can be solved once and 
for all. Each new generation of scholars and practitioners 
is forced to grope for solutions appropriate to the ever- 
changing context in which the problems arise. Hence the 
central position which the issue of control occupies in 
Renate Mayntz's writings on bureaucracy and policy making. 
Especially in the classic study of policy making in the 
German federal bureaucracy conducted with Fritz Scharpf, 
the key dimensions and dilemmas of the control problem in 
the process of policy formation are clearly identified.
On the one hand, when they develop policy initiatives 
and draft programs, top and middle-level bureaucrats do not 
actually implement objectives set by political executives; 
rather, they concretely define such objectives. This is 
because when general objectives are refined and 
operationalized, they shade into specific proposals. Hence 
the finding, so surprising at first sight, that "in the 
federal departments all hierarchical levels are doing 
qualitatively more or less the same thing with respect to 
policy-making, except that they do it on the basis of 
different sets of information, with a different breath of 
horizon and with different decision criteria" (Mayntz and 
Scharpf 1975:98-99).
In other words, contrary to what is implied by the 
traditional dichotomy of policy and administration, it is 
not the case that policy settles everything down to a 




























































































below that point. Policy and administration do not occupy 
two separate spheres of action, nor are they the 
responsibility of two completely separate groups of people. 
Goal setting is not the prerogative of political 
executives, nor do administrators and experts deal only 
with means. One important reason for this is that 
information is asymmetrically distributed, with the top 
lacking the knowledge not only to formulate feasible 
alternatives, but sometimes even to evaluate them. It 
follows that a topdown process of policy making where 
administrators would "derive specific programs deductively 
from general policy goals defined at the top is practically 
impossible, and undesirable too" (ib.:99).
On the other hand, also a bottom up approach in which 
the political executives would renounce the responsibility 
of formulating general policy goals, is impossible —  since 
bureaucrats do not have the requisite information and 
decision criteria —  and also undesirable, since it would 
greatly complicate the problem of political accountability. 
The dilemma is resolved by proposing a "dialogue model" of 
policy making —  a model that, as is so often the case in 
the social sciences, is at the same time normative and 
descriptive, and which anticipates by more than a decade 
currently popular ideas about policy deliberation and 
discursive democracy (Reich 1988; Shapiro 1988; Majone 
1989a: Dryzek 1990). In this model, the different levels of 
the organization are involved in a permanent discussion 
with each other, so that the directives coming from the top 
are shaped by the perceptions of problems, possible 
solutions and situational constraints coming from below, 
while these directives in turn structure perceptions and 
the search for solutions at lower levels (Mayntz and 
Scharpf 1975:100).





























































































The dialogue model expresses a positive assessment of the 
possibility of political control of the bureaucracy. Far 
from attempting to evade or subvert the goals of political 
executives, bureaucrats, at any rate German ones, do their 
best to inform themselves of the intentions, wishes and 
opinions of their political bosses, and to anticipate their 
reactions to new policy proposals. In addition to engaging 
in direct exchanges of opinion with their political 
superiors, bureaucrats "carefully read public speeches and 
public interviews of the minister and the state 
secretaries, and analyze every incidental remark they make. 
Important sources of orientation are the programmatic 
pronouncements made in the government declaration of the 
beginning of the new legislative period, and official 
reports which a number of ministries prepare to document 
their achievements and state future aims" (ib.:101).
These findings agree with the conclusions of the most 
recent American literature on political control, but 
contradict older and still widely accepted theories. Most 
studies conducted before the 1980s saw neither the 
president nor Congress as effective institutions for 
central control of the bureaucracy. Several presidential 
studies came to the conclusion that, in general, presidents 
lack the resources and also the interest to monitor and 
control the federal bureaucracy effectively (Rossiter 1956; 
Fenno 1959; Neustadt 1960; Noll 1971). Similarly, the 
literature on Congress described difficulties with 
legislative control mechanisms. For example, a well known 
empirical study of congressional committee members as 
agency overseers found that members of Congress are 
concerned more with satisfying electors than with 
overseeing the bureaucracy (Scher, 1960). Other studies 
raised questions about the quality of Congressional control 
noting that it is uncoordinated, fragmented and ad hoc.
Several other strands of theory, seemingly unrelated, 




























































































possibility of political control. First, empirical studies 
of the budgetary process pioneered by Wildavsky (1964) 
found that the allocation of public resources is guided by 
simplifying decision rules rather than by rational 
comparisons of costs and benefits as a means of controlling 
and coordinating public policy. Budgeting, according to 
these studies, is decentralized and incremental, resulting 
in automatic increases that further insulate the 
bureaucracy from political control.
Also Niskanen's formal model of the budget maximizing 
bureaucrat emphasized the difficulty of political control 
(Niskanen 1971). In the relationship between the 
legislature that makes the budgetary allocations and the 
bureaucratic agency that provides public goods, the latter 
has the upper hand. This is because the agency knows the 
legislature's demand for its services, while the 
legislators do not know the true cost function of the 
agency. Knowing the legislature's demand function, the 
agency can engage in price discrimination and charge the 
maximum price the legislature is willing to pay. As a 
result, the agency's budget is too large, and the 
politicians will realize no benefits from the exchange. No 
effective political control is possible under the 
assumptions made by the model.
Finally, the capture theory popularized by Stigler 
(1971) and other economists of the Chicago school, 
attempted to show that bureaucracy responds to the wishes 
of the best organized interest groups rather than to 
political directives or to some abstract notion of the 
public interest. In fact, Stigler's model ignores the fact 
that regulators are usually agents of a political executive 
or legislature, not elected politicians. Hence, regulatory 
capture is asserted rather than proved.
In the 1980s views about the possibility of political 
control of bureaucracy began to change for a number of 




























































































formal modelling of the control problem; more sophisticated 
statistical analyses correlating time series of agency 
outputs with various indicators of the preferences of 
political principals; greater attention to the design of 
control mechanisms as a practical application of the theory 
of "new institutionalism" in economics and political 
science; but also the rise to power of political leaders 
like President Reagan and Mrs.Thatcher committed to the 
goal of rolling back the state and reducing the role of 
public bureaucracies.
Among the most significant theoretical developments of 
the 1980s are the applications of the economics of 
organization and in particular of agency theory (or 
principal-agent models) to the study of bureaucratic 
discretion. The starting point of agency theory is that in 
a principal-agent relationship information is 
asymmetrically distributed. The agent usually has more 
information than the principal about the details of the 
tasks assigned to him, as well as about his own actions, 
abilities and preferences. Agents can take advantage of the 
high costs of measuring their characteristics and 
performance to engage in opportunistic behavior. Such 
behavior imposes costs on the principal who finds it in her 
interest to monitor agent's behavior and structure the 
contract in a way that reduces "agency costs".
Applications of agency theory to the problem of 
political control make two key assumptions (Wood and 
Waterman 1991: 802-03). First, bureaucratic agents are 
bound by contract to serve democratic principals; their 
primary duty is faithful implementation of the law. Second, 
through time the interests of politicians and bureaucrats 
tend to diverge. This is because political coalitions 
change from those existing when democratic principals 
adopted a certain policy, and because bureaucracies develop 





























































































Thus when politicians try to control policy 
implementation, bureaucrats will often try to shirk their 
demands. The question is how (whether) politicians can 
overcome this shirking tendency as well as the tendency of 
bureaucrats to use their information advantages to 
manipulate the choice sets of their political superiors. 
Agency theory suggests that sophisticated politicians 
recognize these dangers and can take countermeasures. 
Political control is possible because elected principals 
create bureaucracies: "They design bureaucracies with 
incentive structures to facilitate control. Political 
principals also monitor bureaucratic activities to offset 
information imbalances. When bureaucratic activities stray 
from the desired result, policy makers apply sanctions or 
rewards to bring them back in line. Thus, the theory is 
dynamic, positing well-informed central decision makers who 
systematically mold the preferences of bureaucratic agents" 
(ib.:803).
In fact, several empirical studies carried out during 
the 1980s found evidence of the capacity of democratic 
institutions to control policy formulation and 
implementation. For example, Moe (1982) analyzed annual 
outputs from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and found that they varied 
with changing presidential administrations. In a later 
study, the same author, using quarterly data on NLRB 
decisions, found that they were influenced by all three 
major political institutions —  the president, Congress and 
the courts (Moe 1985).
The importance of congressional control is emphasized 
by Weingast and Moran (1983). Using annual data on FTC 
decisions, these authors show that the policy preferences 
of members of Congressional committees with oversight 
responsibilities play an important role in determining the 




























































































causes changes in agency policy. Similarly, in a detailed 
legislative and legal history of antitrust policy making 
from 1969 to 1976, Kovacic (1987) argues that the FTC, 
rather than ignoring congressional preferences as suggested 
by older theories, chose antitrust programs that were 
consistent with and responsive to the policy preferences of 
its oversight committees in Congress.
On the other hand, a study of the FTC during the 
period 1981 to 1984 when President Reagan attempted to 
introduce major regulatory reforms —  including reduction 
of the agency's budget, application of cost-benefit tests 
to justify agency's actions, and adoption of a less 
confrontational approach to compliance —  found that 
despite some success in reducing the budget of the agency, 
the reform agenda remained only partially implemented by 
1984. This was due mainly to Congressional opposition to 
budget cuts. No longer able to use budget increases to 
induce the agency to comply with their wishes, the 
appropriations committees used legislative language in 
budget resolutions to impose performance standards 
specifying precisely both those activities to be provided 
and those not to be provided by the FTC (Yandle 1987).
3. Political Control with Multiple Principals 
The economic theory of agency is used mainly to analyze 
hierarchical relationships. The studies mentioned above, 
and especially Yandle's conclusions, suggest that in order 
to be applicable to the problem of political control, the 
theory must be extended to include the case of multiple 
principals —  democratic principals but perhaps also client 
and interest groups. In turn, a more general theory raises 
a number of new questions concerning, for example, the 
relative influence of different principals, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of various instruments and 
strategies of control, and the possibility of coalitions 




























































































research, both theoretical and empirical, is beginning to 
provide answers to such questions.
As noted above, agency theory would predict that among 
principals, legislators are the most influential ones, 
since it is statutes that create bureaucracies and provide 
the structure of incentives that should minimize the 
divergence between legislative intentions and bureaucratic 
outputs. This is in fact the opinion of many scholars, 
especially, of course, those specializing in legislative 
politics. The conclusion reached by Herbert Kaufman in his 
detailed study of a half dozen federal bureau chiefs, 
namely that "no other external group or institution enjoyed 
quite so commanding a position as Congress" (Kaufman 
1981:165), still enjoys widespread support. However, it has 
been noted that legislators find it more efficient under 
severe time constraints to monitor bureaucratic performance 
indirectly rather than through oversight hearings; to a 
large extent, they rely on program recipients, lobbyists 
and interest groups to provide information on bureaucratic 
performance (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Compared to Congress, presidential control is more 
direct. The most important instrument of executive control 
appears to be the power of appointment and removal. For 
example, Wood and Waterman (1991:804) note that "[t]he 
Reagan presidency more than any other epitomized the use of 
political appointments to affect political control. The 
Reagan transition team spent months screening those who 
would serve, emphasizing loyalty and ideology above all 
other attributes".
Other important instruments of executive control are 
administrative reorganizations and the ever-increasing use 
of the president's managerial arm, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). The Wood and Waterman study of seven 
administrative agencies from the late 1970s through most of 
the 1980s probably represents the most detailed analysis to 




























































































appointments, budget increases and decreases, congressional 
oversight hearings, administrative reorganizations, and 
legislation. All seven agencies appeared to be politically 
responsive, at least in the period examined. The data 
indicate that among the tools of political control, the 
power to appoint is the most effective and most frequently 
used! in five of the seven cases examined, agency outputs 
shifted immediately after a change in agency leadership. 
Reorganization, congressional oversight and budgeting are 
also important. The authors conclude that the evidence for 
active political control is so strong that controversy 
should now end over whether political control of the 
bureaucracy is possible. Instead, future research should 
concentrate on a detailed analysis of the various 
mechanisms of control (ib.:822).
In fact, a general model should include also factors 
not considered in the Wood and Waterman study, like the 
formal and informal influence of the public (e.g., through 
public hearings) and especially the role of the courts. An 
otherwise excellent paper by Jeffrey Hill (1985) shows how 
the practical value of theoretically interesting 
conclusions can be reduced by the omission of important 
variables. Using public-choice arguments Hill shows that 
bureaucrats can influence policy outcomes by colluding with 
previously latent legislative majorities. Specifically, in 
a complex situation where policies must be described by at 
least two dimensions, a senior bureaucrat can construct an 
implementation coalition that differs from the original 
legislative coalition. For this it is sufficient that the 
bureaucrat's preferred alternative be closer to the "ideal 
points" of a majority of legislators than the bill which 
they helped pass. Thus the discretion of the bureaucrat 
derives not from defying legislative intent but from the 
possibility of constructing new majorities. As Bendor 
(1990) notes, this is a very interesting result because it 




























































































problems can arise even when information is complete. 
Problems can arise solely from the legislature's difficulty 
in reaching stable collective choices, without the need of 
making the standard assumption of agency theory that 
information is asymmetrically distributed between agent and 
principal(s). However, the model effectively assumes that 
the courts will not punish administrative deviations from a 
statutory mandate. On the other hand, if legislators know 
in advance that judicial review is very likely, they would 
be committed to the policy originally chosen. Hence the 
formal analysis conveys an impression of greater 
administrative discretion than is empirically plausible 
(Bendor 1990: 392-95).
A final, and for the purpose of this paper crucial 
question concerns the scope of political control of the 
bureaucracy: is the possibility of control limited to 
certain agencies —  perhaps those studied by the authors 
mentioned above —  or does it extend more generally? In the 
remainder of this paper I shall argue that in order to be 
effective, political control must rely on different mixes 
of instruments according to the nature of the bureaucracy 
to be controlled. In particular, regulatory agencies 
require more complex systems of control than central 
administrative offices. This distinction is particularly 
important in the European context where the growth of 
regulatory bodies is a more recent phenomenon than in 
America.
4. The Independent Regulatory Commissions
In the study referred to above. Wood and Waterman note that 
"agency responsiveness and stability can roughly be arrayed 
along a continuum which aligns nicely with certain 
bureaucratic attributes. The agencies most responsive to 
executive influence, gauged by the magnitude and duration 
of change, were those situated in the executive 




























































































most stable outputs were the independent regulatory 
commissions" (Wood and Waterman 1991: 823).
This is of course what one would expect since 
independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) were created by 
Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from 
presidential control and short-term political 
considerations. Although IRCs cover an extremely wide range 
of administrative activities —  from the control of prices, 
routes and service conditions of surface transportation 
companies by the Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 
1887, to the licensing of nuclear power plants by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, created in 1975 —  they all 
share some organizational characteristics that are meant to 
protect their decisional autonomy: they are multi-headed 
having five or seven members; they are bi-partisan; members 
are appointed by the president with the consent of the 
Senate and serve for fixed, staggered terms.
The IRCs are independent in the sense that — unlike 
the single-headed line agencies —  they operate outside the 
presidential hierarchy in making their policy decisions, 
although subject to the same budgetary review by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) as line agencies. As the US 
Supreme Court asserted in Humphrey's Executor vs. United 
States (1935) commissioners can be removed from office only 
for official misbehavior, not for disagreement with 
presidential policy.
The degree of effective independence of the IRCs has 
changed in the course of their century-old history. In the 
earliest period and through the New Deal era, Congress was 
very strongly in favor of independence. Indeed, the 
independence of the important regulatory bodies created 
during the New Deal —  Federal Communications Commission, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board 
—  was the price president F.D.Roosevelt had to pay for 
acceptance by Congress and the Supreme Court of far- 




























































































would have preferred to assign the new functions to 
executive departments under his immediate control; but this 
the other branches of government were not willing to accept 
(Shapiro 1988).
However, criticisms of the IRCs in the 1950s and 1960s 
for their lack of political accountability and their 
alleged tendency to be captured by private interests, 
produced a reaction in favor of presidential control. 
Legislative amendments changed the chairperson terms from 
fixed to service at the will of the president in most 
regulatory agencies, and gave the chairperson stronger 
administrative authority over the other commissioners. Thus 
the original collegiality of the IRCs has been 
substantially eroded. At the same time, however, Congress 
has increased the independence of the regulatory 
commissions by requiring that a number of IRCs submit their 
budget simultaneously to Congress and to the OMB, and by 
exempting some of the financial regulatory agencies from 
OMB clearance of their legislative proposals (Reagan 
1987:51).
In the debate over the degree of independence which 
IRCs should enjoy, the majority of liberal scholars have 
traditionally supported presidential supervision of the 
regulatory process. Marver Bernstein, one of the most 
influential critics of the IRCs, maintained that isolation 
from the presidency results in a lack of presidential 
support which leads to capture of the regulators by the 
supposedly regulated industries: "Cut loose from 
presidential leadership in protection, the agencies must 
formulate policy in a political vacuum. Into this vacuum 
move the regulated interests themselves, and by 
infiltration overcome the weak regulatory defenses to 
become the strongest influences upon the regulator"
(William D.Carey quoted in Bernstein 1955: 138-39).
Cass Sunstein adds three more reasons for presidential 




























































































national constituency. Hence, the president's supervisory 
role should increase the likelihood that discretionary 
decisions by regulatory agencies should respond to the 
national interest rather than to parochial pressures of 
members of Congress. Second, only the president can 
coordinate the entire regulatory process. This capacity is 
especially important in light of the proliferation of 
regulatory agencies with overlapping responsibilities. 
Finally, the president is able not only to coordinate, but 
also to direct regulatory policy in a way that would be 
difficult or impossible if that policy were set 
individually by agency officials. Presidential control 
allows the government to respond to shifts in public 
opinion, reducing the likelihood that politics will become 
routinized and heavily bureaucratized (Sunstein 1987: 452- 
53).
Because of the liberal critique of the IRCs, most of 
the regulatory bodies created in the 1970s —  agencies like 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration or the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration —  were organized as single­
headed executive agencies, either reporting directly to the 
president (the case of the EPA) or in the line of command 
from the president down through the executive-branch 
hierarchy. But, ironically, the most dramatic steps to 
ensure centralized direction of regulation have been taken 
not by Democratic presidents, but by president Reagan with 
two Executive Orders that concentrated supervisory 
authority in the Office of Management and Budget. Executive 
Order 12291, issued in 1981, permits OMB to review and 
comment on regulations proposed by executive agencies, 
testing the regulations to see that they are justified in 
cost-benefit terms.
Executive Order 12498, issued in 1985, went one step 
further, requiring agencies to submit for OMB approval an 




























































































next year. Such centralization and coordination were meant 
to ensure that policy would be managed by an institution 
with a view of the entire regulatory process. The emphasis 
on cost-benefit analysis was designed to discipline agency 
decisions by comparing the social benefits produced by 
regulation with its full costs, that is, not only the 
administrative costs of producing and enforcing the rules 
but, more important, the costs imposed on the economy by 
the regulatory requirements.
However, cost-benefit analysis is not an exact 
science, and it is easy to see how demands for an economic 
justification of agency decisions may be used to delay or 
even roll back regulatory programs which the president does 
not favor. This is precisely what happened under president 
Reagan. For example, in 1985 the OMB found that almost 30 
percent of the agency rules it reviewed were not consistent 
with Executive Order 12291. It required changes in about 23 
percent of the cases while the agencies themselves withdrew 
more than 3 percent of the rules (Sunstein 1987: 421). In 
addition, the OMB has been accused by environmentalists of 
having significantly delayed EPA regulations with which it 
did not agree. At the same time Congress, concerned about 
the mounting costs of social regulation —  environmental 
and consumer protection, health and safety at the 
workplace, equal opportunities for minorities, 
transportation policy for the disabled, and so on —  and 
the consequent threats to employment and to the 
international competitiveness of American industry, was not 
pushing the agencies very hard to implement the statutes of 
the 1970s.
5. An Independent "Fourth Branch" of Government?
Faced by a reluctant Congress and by a president with 
strong antiregulatory views, some liberal scholars and 
representatives of public-interest groups began arguing 




























































































social regulation should be viewed as a fourth branch of 
government not answerable to either Congress or president. 
As Shapiro (1988: 108) writes:
If you don't trust Congress and know 
that the president is the enemy, who is 
left to love and nurture the health, 
safety and environmental legislation of 
the sixties and seventies? All that is 
left is the bureaucracy of the new 
federal agencies who were recruited 
only recently and retain their 
enthusiasm for doing what they were 
hired to do. They want to regulate in 
behalf of the great public values of 
health, safety, and environmental 
purity. So it becomes attractive to 
those favoring regulation to turn the 
federal bureaucracy into an independent 
branch of government. Such a branch 
would be free of the president, even 
free of the Congress of the eighties, 
but loyal to the sweeping statutory 
language of the sixties and seventies.
It is another irony of the recent history of regulation in
America that the label "fourth branch of government" was
used in the past to attack, rather than defend,
administrative regulation for its lack of political
accountability and its violation of the separation of
powers theory. Thus, the President's Commission on
Administrative Management (Brownlow Commission) noted in
1937 that the independent regulatory commissions
"constitute a headless "fourth branch" of government, a
haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and
uncoordinated power. They do violence to the basic theory
of the American Constitution that there should be three





























































































Indeed, the notion of an independent regulatory fourth 
branch appears at first sight highly problematic in view of 
the traditional separation of powers theory and of the 
constitutional position of the president as head of the 
executive branch and its agencies. Yet, today's advocates 
of an independent regulatory bureaucracy can produce a 
number of political and legal arguments to support their 
views. In terms of political philosophy, they can draw on 
strands of the American political tradition that emphasize 
the value of independent, non-majoritarian institutions, 
like the courts, for democratic government. There is, 
first, the Madisonian tradition that views insulation of 
government as a possible safeguard against "factionalism" - 
- the usurpation of government by powerful and self- 
interested groups —  and the threats which factionalism 
poses to the republican belief in deliberative democracy. 
Also the tradition of the Progressive movement, represented 
by such political leaders as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow 
Wilson, attached great importance to the insulation of 
government from short-term party politics and electoral 
interests as a way of ensuring both efficiency and honesty 
in public affairs (Hofstadter 1955). Finally, the ideology 
of the New Deal defended the independence of the regulatory 
commissions as necessary to the acquisition and use of that 
expertise which was their raison d'être. Such commissions 
emerged and became important instruments of governance for 




























































































unable to satisfy the "great functional imperative" of 
specialization. In the words of Merle Fainsod, regulatory 
agencies "commended themselves because they offered the 
possibility of achieving expertness in the treatment of 
special problems, relative freedom from the exigencies of 
party politics in their consideration and expeditiousness 
in their disposition" (Fainsod 1940: 313).
One must keep in mind that all regulatory agencies are 
created by congressionally enacted statutes. The programs 
they operate are created, defined and limited by such 
statutes. Hence, even though such agencies are responsible 
to the president as head of the executive branch of which 
they are part, their legal authority, their objectives and 
sometimes even the means to achieve those objectives are to 
be found in congressional statutes. In short, regulatory 
agencies have two bosses, not one, and as Martin Shapiro 
has observed, it is much easier to get out from under two 
bosses with ambiguous and contradictory authority than it 
is to get out from under one boss with clear authority.
To understand the institutional implications of the 
controversy over the fourth branch of government, another 
consideration is important. Since passage of the Federal 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946, regulatory 
decision making has undergone a far-reaching process of 
judicialization. It will be remembered that the activities 
of regulatory agencies, commissions or boards include all 




























































































judicial (adjudication) and executive (enforcement). Under 
APA, agency adjudication (a case-by-case, trial-type 
process for the formulation of an order) was made to look 
like court adjudication, including the adversarial process 
for obtaining evidence through presentations of the 
contending parties, and the requirement of a written record 
as the basis of agency decision. Clearly, these and similar 
procedural requirements greatly simplify judicial review of 
administrative adjudication.
On the other hand, APA requirements for rule making 
are less demanding: before promulgating a rule, the agency 
must provide public notice and opportunity for comments; 
when it promulgates the rule, it must supply a concise 
general statement of the rule's "basis and purpose"; the 
rule can be set aside by a court only if it is "arbitrary, 
capricious, or abuse of discretion" —  the "lunacy test", 
as this lax standard for judicial review has been called. 
Such difference in requirements for adjudication and rule 
making did not matter much as long as most regulation was 
of the rate-setting and permit-allocation types and hence 
relied largely on adjudication. However, with the growth of 
social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, rule making 
(e.g., standard setting) became much more important. Thus, 
the courts began to develop a large body of new procedural 
rules and strict standards of judicial review for rule 
making proceedings. Finally, in the 1980s there were 




























































































discretion —  the residual category of what agencies do, 
which is neither adjudication nor rule making —  court-like 
as well (Shapiro 1988: 111). For example, agencies were 
required to justify their regulatory priorities or risk 
assessments through the use of cost-benefit or risk 
analysis (Greenwood 1984).
The progressive judicialization of regulatory 
proceedings makes the arguments in favor of an independent 
regulatory branch more plausible by making the agencies 
more and more court-lie. After all, one of the most 
important characteristics of courts is their independence. 
If it is improper for a president or member of Congress to 
interfere with a judicial decision, the same ought to be 
true with respect to the decisions of a court-like agency. 
This does not mean, of course, that regulatory decisions 
should be taken in a political and institutional vacuum.
The authority of Congress to define broad policy objectives 
and the responsibility of the president to coordinate the 
entire regulatory process to ensure internal coherence, are 
not questioned. Rather, the advocates of an independent 
fourth branch, but also some supporters of stronger 
presidential control like Cass Sunstein, favor a bigger 
role for the courts in controlling agency discretion 
through procedural and substantive review of rule making 
(Ackerman and Hassler 1981; Shapiro 1988; Edley 1990; 




























































































If a pro-deregulation president can mount a frontal 
assault on social regulation, and if members of Congress 
are too concerned with their own re-election to worry about 
the coherence of statutory programs, only the courts can 
provide the necessary continuity of the regulatory process. 
They, more than any other branch of government, are 
committed to preserving continuity of meaning in statutory 
law. What is suggested here is a partnership between 
regulatory agencies and courts. By both procedural and 
substantive means, but especially by statutory 
interpretation, the courts should insist that regulators 
continue to pursue with vigor the objectives set by 
Congress in the 1960s and 1970s, even when other political 
forces try to use recently elected members of Congress and 
presidents to cut back on regulation in the name of 
economic development (Shapiro 1988: 127). In return, 
judges should protect the independence of the regulators.
But what about political accountability? Is government 
by judges and technocratic experts compatible with 
democratic principles? The writers considered here are 
quite aware of the importance of these questions, but they 
point out that government by elected politicians, too, 
suffers from a number of defects that have been extensively 
documented by public-choice theorists (Mueller 1989). For 
example, in seeking re-election, legislators engage in 
advertising and position taking rather than in serious 




























































































opportunities to aid particular constituencies. In either 
case, re-election pressures have serious consequences for 
the quality of legislation. On the other hand, 
proregulatory scholars ask rhetorically, if the courts 
require the regulatory process to be open to public input 
and scrutiny and to act on the basis of competent analyses, 
are the regulators necessarily less accountable than 
elected politicians? (Rose-Ackerman 1992: 34).
Summarizing and simplifying a complex debate, one can 
identify three main schools of thought concerning the 
problem of political control of regulatory bureaucracies. 
Initially, pluralist theorists rejected as naive the New 
Deal assumptions that regulators are guided in their 
decisions by their conception of the public interest, and 
that their discretion is disciplined by scientific and 
technical expertise. Pluralists doubted the expertise of 
regulatory agencies and argued that independence from 
presidential control, combined with broad delegation of 
rule making power by Congress, led to the capture of the 
agencies by the most powerful and best organized private 
interests. Subsequent empirical research, largely inspired 
by agency theory and the new institutionalism, showed that, 
in fact, agencies are responsive, in varying degrees, to 
the wishes of their political principals, and especially to 
those of the legislators.
These findings seemed to vindicate traditional beliefs 




























































































accountable. However, the value of agency responsiveness to 
political principals becomes questionable once it is 
realized that new political forces can put pressure on 
Congress and the president to cut back on social regulation 
in the name of economic development. Under such 
circumstances continuity with the policies of the past 
could be preserved only by reasserting the faith of the New 
Deal in the independence of the regulatory agencies. 
However, while New Dealers viewed the courts with 
suspicion, the new advocates of a fourth independent branch 
see judicial review as the most effective means to ensure 
the democratic accountability of the regulators.
6. Regulation in Europe
This debate on the independence and political 
accountability of regulators would be only of academic 
interest for non-Americans were not for the fact that 
administrative regulation —  economic and social regulation 
by means of agencies operating outside the line of 
hierarchical control or oversight ("tutelle") by the 
central administration —  is rapidly becoming the new 
frontier of public policy and public administration 
throughout the industrialized world. In Europe this 
development has become particularly noticeable in the last 
two decades. In France, for example, the expression 
"autorité administrative indépendante" was used for the 




























































































Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés, but 
several independent regulatory agencies already existed 
prior to that date: the Commission de Contrôle des Banques 
created in 1941 and transformed into the Commission 
Bancaire by the law of 24 January 1984; the Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse (1967), whose powers have been 
significantly extended by the law of 2 August 1984; the 
Médiateur (1973), the only single-headed regulatory agency 
created so far in France. Today there are some 17 
independent agencies including, in addition to those 
already mentioned, the Commission d ’Accès aux Documents 
Administratifs (1978), the Commission de la Sécurité des 
Consommateurs (1983) and the Commission de Contrôle des 
Assurances (1989) (Guédon 1991).
In Britain, too, the 1970s have been a period of 
significant institutional innovation, especially in the 
area of social regulation. The Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (1972), the Civil Aviation Authority (1972), the 
Health and Safety Commission (1974), the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (1976) and the Commission for 
Racial Equality (1976), are only some of the regulatory 
bodies created in this period (Baldwin and McCrudden 1987). 
Despite the hostility of Conservative governments toward 
any kind of "quangos", a number of independent agencies 
were set up also in the 1980s and early 1990s, partly 
because it was realized that in many cases privatization 




























































































monopolies unless the newly privatized companies were 
subjected to public regulation of profits, prices, and 
entry and service conditions. Thus the development of a 
whole new regulatory structure has paralleled the sale 
process of industries like British Telecommunications, 
British Gas and other public utilities. This structure 
rests on a body of economic law involving a large number of 
specific obligations and license conditions placed on the 
privatized industries, and on a new breed of regulatory 
agencies, the regulatory offices or ROs: Office of 
Telecommunications (1984), Office of Gas Supply (1986), 
Office of Water Services (1989), Office of Electricity 
Regulation (1990).
Parallel, if slower, institutional developments are 
taking place in all other European countries, so it is 
natural to ask what are the reasons for both the sudden 
growth of administrative regulation and the lateness of its 
arrival on the European political stage. Regulation, it has 
been said, is the new border between the state and the 
economy, and also the battleground for ideas on how the 
economy should be run (Veljanovski 1991: 4). Economic and 
social policies in the decades immediately following the 
end of World War II were legitimized by the widespread 
belief that government could control the economy by 
manipulating key macroeconomic variables and, at the same 
time, ensure social justice and greater equality in the 




























































































state could be maintained only as long as the economy was 
expanding. The stagflation of the 1970s showed that growth 
could not be assumed; keynesianism was proclaimed dead. The 
rejection of demand management and "fine tuning" eroded the 
credibility of more direct forms of state intervention in 
the economy: nationalizations, municipalizations, 
industrial reorganizations, national or regional planning.
However, skepticism in the ability of the state to act 
as entrepreneur, planner, employer of last resort, and 
direct provider of services did not lead to demands for a 
return to laissez-faire, as the more radical advocates of 
privatization and deregulation seemed to expect. Instead, 
there was a demand for better focused and more flexible 
forms of public intervention, and for more attention to 
those areas of social regulation (environment, consumer 
protection, freedom of information) which were often 
neglected by the welfare policies of the past. Thus, 
paradoxically, the debate on privatization and deregulation 
contributed to directing the attention of European public 
opinion to regulation as a distinct mode of policy making 
aimed at correcting specific types of market failure like 
monopoly power, negative externalities and inadequate or 
asymmetrically distributed information (Majone 1991).
Of course, the interventionist policies of the past 
had attempted to solve many of the same regulatory 
problems, but the traditional solutions tended to be much 




























































































regulation. For example, nationalization (or 
municipalization) has been in most countries of Europe the 
functional equivalent of American-style regulation in such 
key areas as transportation, telecommunications and public 
utilities. This functional equivalence is so close, in some 
respects, that it is possible to establish a one-to-one 
correspondence between typical forms of regulatory failure 
and certain well-known problems of public ownership, as in 




























































































Failures of Economic 
Regulation
Failures of Nationalized 
Industries





Anticompetitive regulation Public monopolies
Vague objectives ("regulate 
in the public interest")
Ambiguous and inconsistent 
goals given to public 
managers
Poor coordination among 
different regulators
Poor (ex ante and ex post) 
coordination among public 
enterprises
Problem of political 
accountability of 
regulatory agencies
No effective control over 
public enterprises either by 
Parliament, the Courts, or 
the sponsoring minister
Table 1: Comparing Two Types of Government Failure 
Probably because of these similarities, some economists have 
argued that there is no great difference between public 
monopolies, like the PTTs, and privately owned but publicly 
regulated monopolies, like American Telephone and Telegraph 
before deregulation. However, the purpose of public ownership 
was not simply to control prices, conditions of entry or 
quality of service, but also to achieve many other goals like 
economic development, technical innovation, personal or, more 
commonly, regional income redistribution, and national 
security (Ambrosius 1984). While nationalizations and other 
traditional forms of direct state intervention were justified 




























































































single normative justification: improving microeconomic 
efficiency by correcting some specific form of market failure. 
Note that this justification applies not only to economic, but 
also to social regulation. Thus, the purpose of environmental 
regulation is to reduce negative externalities caused by 
pollution: microeconomic efficiency is increased by reducing 
the difference between the private and the social cost of 
pollution.
The adoption of microeconomic efficiency as the main 
normative criterion has several important consequences. It 
implies, for example, that regulatory instruments should not 
be used to achieve redistributional or other social policy 
goals (Majone 1993). The institutional implications are 
particularly relevant to our discussion. The use of 
specialized, single-purpose agencies is an obvious consequence 
of the focused approach characteristic of regulation. Also in 
this respect, there is a striking difference between the 
American approach and the organizational solutions of the past 
in Europe. Here, even when traditional techniques of 
administrative regulation were used, such as entry and price 
regulation, standard setting, or licensing, there was a 
general reluctance to rely on specialized, single-purpose or 
single-industry regulatory agencies. Instead, important 
regulatory functions were assigned to some obscure office 
buried in the bowels of a large ministry, or to an inter- 




























































































judicial review or independent scrutiny. Hence the low 
visibility of regulatory policy making in Europe.
The reasons for the reluctance to set up independent 
agencies varied according to different constitutional, 
political and administrative traditions, but the net result 
was everywhere the same: a serious mismatch between the 
increasingly specialized functions of government and the 
administrative instruments as its disposal. Only after the 
mismatch became too obvious to be overlooked did European 
scholars begin to produce functional justifications for the 
rise of independent regulatory agencies. These justifications 
are strongly reminiscent of the arguments of earlier American 
writers. Thus it is said that agencies are justified by the 
need of expertise in highly complex or technical matters, 
combined with a rule making or adjudicative function that is 
inappropriate for a government department or a court; that an 
agency structure may favor public participation, while the 
opportunity for consultations by means of public hearings is 
often denied to government departments because of the 
conventions under which they operate; that agencies' 
separateness from government is useful whenever it is hoped to 
free government administration from partisan politics and 
party political influence. Agencies are also said to provide 
greater continuity and stability than cabinets because they 
are one step removed from election returns; and the exercise 
of a policy making function by an administrative agency should 




























































































the application of policy to particular circumstances.
Finally, it is argued that independent agencies can protect 
citizens from bureaucratic arrogance and reticence, and are 
able to focus public attention on controversial issues, thus 
enriching public debate (Baldwin and McCrudden 1987: 4-9; 
Teitgen-Colly 1988: 37-47; Vesperini 1990: 415-19; Guedon 
1991: 16-27).
The growth of administrative regulation in Europe owes 
much to these newly articulated perceptions of a mismatch 
between existing institutional capacities and the growing 
complexity of policy problems: policing financial markets in 
an increasingly interdependent world economy; controlling the 
risks of new products and new technologies; protecting the 
health and economic interests of consumers without impeding 
the free flow of goods, services and people across national 
boundaries; reducing environmental pollution. It is sufficient 
to mention these problems such as these to realize how 
significant is the supranational dimension of the new economic 
and social regulation. Hence the important role of the 
European Community in complementing the regulatory capacities 
of the member states.
For reasons I have discussed elsewhere (Majone 1992a, 
1992b), the power of Community institutions does not rest, as 
in the member states, on the power of taxing and spending, but 
on that of rule making. In short, this is because the budget 
of the Community is very small —  less than 1.3 percent of the 




























































































approval of the "Delors II" package. In addition, more than 70 
percent of this small budget is spent for the Common 
Agriculture Policy and a handful of redistributive programs. 
Given these constraints, the only way for the EC Commission to 
increase its influence is to expand the scope of its rule 
making. This it can do since an important characteristic of 
regulatory policy making is the limited influence of budgetary 
limitations on the activities of regulators. The size of non- 
regulatory, direct-expenditure programs is constrained by 
budgetary appropriations and, ultimately, by the size of 
government tax revenues. In contrast, the real costs of 
regulatory programs are borne directly by the firms and 
individuals who have to comply with them. This structural 
difference between regulatory policies and policies involving 
the direct expenditure of public funds is particularly 
important in the case of the Community, since not only the 
economic, but also the political and administrative costs of 
enforcing EC regulations are borne by the member states. This 
explains the continuous growth of Community rule making in 
practically every area of economic and social regulation. 
Because of the volume and depth of EC regulations it is 
impossible to discuss the issue of the political control of 
regulatory bureaucracies in Europe without taking also the 
supranational dimension into consideration.




























































































Given the growing importance of administrative regulation in 
Europe, a major challenge for legislators and policy makers is 
to avoid repeating the mistakes of the era of nationalizations 
when designing the new regulatory structures. The legislation 
which brought many large enterprises into public ownership 
after World War II typically prescribed objectives only in the 
most general terms and saw the role of the managers of 
nationalized enterprises as that of the trustees of the public 
interest. The managers were supposed to decide at arm's length 
from government, though certain powers of government over them 
were provided, notably power for the sponsoring minister to 
appoint board members and chairman, to issue general 
directions, and to approve investment plans.
In fact, ministerial interference in the day-to-day 
activities of the nationalized corporations was frequent and 
pervasive, but political pressures were applied through 
informal and usually secret processes. The ministerial power 
to give general directions, though little used for its true 
purpose, was often invoked as a means of escaping unpopular 
decisions (Wade 1988: 161). Parliaments, on the other hand, 
were seriously handicapped in controlling large public 
corporations by the lack of time, of expertise, and of 
reliable information. The reluctance of public managers to 
supply meaningful information was such a pervasive feature of 
nationalizations that already in 1951 W.Arthur Lewis could 




























































































British railways than was available before they were 
nationalized (W.Arthur Lewis 1951).
By the end of the 1970s the politicization of the 
nationalized industries, in the UK and elsewhere, was 
complete. The principle that they should operate independently 
of the government —  a principle reiterated by president 
Mitterand as late as 1983 when he asserted that "the 
nationalized industries should have total autonomy of decision 
and action" (Le Monde, 28 may 1983; cited in Hall 1986: 204) - 
- had been replaced by the practice of detailed ministerial 
intervention, particularly on pricing and personnel decisions.
Paradoxically, frequent political interference, exerted 
discreetly when not secretly, undermined the very principle of 
political accountability. Veljanovski's summary evaluation of 
the British experience is also valid for many other European 
countries:
The management of the nationalized 
industries and the rôle accorded to that 
most enigmatic of British political 
institutions, ministerial accountability, 
ensured that the political end of 
regulation was hidden behind the anonymity 
of central government departments. As part 
of their monopoly, the nationalised 
industries had regulatory functions 
combining the rôles of defendant, judge, 
jury and prosecutor in protecting their 
operations, especially from competition. 
Industries were subject to unclear and 
conflicting objectives, poor systems of 
control, and capture by trade unions and 
politicians (Veljanovski 1991: 6).
Unfortunately, old habits of secretiveness and ministerial
interference seem to persist even after privatization. This




























































































tradition of regulation by independent agencies but also, as 
Prosser and others have argued, the unwillingness to learn 
from foreign, especially American, experiences, Serious flaws 
in the design of institutions to regulate the newly privatized 
industries can be detected in the choice of a non- 
participatory model, with none of the public hearings and 
other procedural characteristics of U.S. regulation; in the 
creation of a system of agencies linked to particular 
industries, rather than the pattern of commissions regulating 
a range of utilities in order to reduce the risk of agency 
capture; and in the fact that government departments still 
preserve important regulatory powers, so that the operations 
of agencies often are dependent on prior decisions of the 
minister laying down the principles to be applied. The danger 
is that these powers of direction "could be abused to exert 
behind-the-scenes pressure on the regulator in much the same 
way as pressure was put on the nationalized industries by 
government, precisely the situation which the privatization 
programme is supposed to render impossible " (Prosser 1989:
147) .
In Britain the threat to the decision making autonomy of 
regulatory agencies is at least recognized and openly debated. 
In other countries the threat is equally serious, but there 
is, perhaps, less public awareness of it. Thus in France, the 
Minister of the Economy maintains important powers to regulate 
economic competition despite the creation in 1986 of the 




























































































remains the final decision maker in matters relating to 
mergers and acquisitions, and the power of investigating anti­
competitive practices is still in the hands of the 
administration. Obviously, the government has kept for itself 
these important prerogatives in order to be able to deploy the 
"competition weapon", and especially the power to launch an 
investigation, in its dealings with economic interests. A good 
example of the prevalence of short-run political 
considerations over regulatory objectives is an early decision 
by the Conseil to dissolve the monopoly of the druggists over 
certain products, like cosmetics and baby milk, which could be 
sold anywhere without risks for the public health. The 
corporation of the pharmacists mobilized its political 
resources and the liberal government, which would normally 
have been expected to support greater economic competition, 
overrode the regulatory agency, reinstituting the druggists' 
monopoly over the small range of products not already covered 
by law (Demarigny 1993).
Although the German Bundeskartellamt is an older and more 
powerful agency than the Conseil de la Concurrence (it can, 
for example, undertake investigations into anti-competitive 
practices), it too is subject to ministerial decisions. Thus, 
in 1989 the agency opposed the merger of Daimler Benz with the 
Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm Company on the ground that the new 
group would have a dominant position in several industries 
ranging from defense electronics to aerospace and 




























































































competition in important markets, the Minister of the Economy 
overrode the Bundeskartellamt allowing the merger to take 
place, subject to some conditions, in the name of industrial 
policy.
In sum, the issue of the independence of regulatory 
agencies, and the correlative problem of their political 
control and democratic accountability, are yet far from being 
resolved. Such agencies are still "constitutional anomalies 
which do not fit well into the framework of controls, checks 
and balances" (Veljanovski 1991: 16). Citing article 20 of the 
Constitution of 1958: "Le gouvernement ... dispose de 
l'Administration .... Il est responsable devant le 
Parlement...", a French author points out that the creation of 
independent regulatory bodies "met en cause des principes 
essentiels de notre droit: le principe de démocratie d'une 
part, le principe de l'Etat de droit d'autre part" (Teitgen- 
Colly 1988: 49). To be sure, it is no easy task to fit the new 
institutions into the constitutional framework of countries 
where the diffraction of state power is seen as a direct 
challenge to parliamentary sovereignty or to the principle of 
a rigid separation of powers. Expressed in traditional terms 
the dilemma is: either the regulatory agencies are part of the 
state administration, and then they cannot be independent; or 
else they are independent, but in this case to whom are they 
accountable?
It is impossible to escape this dilemma without 




























































































constitutional axiom of the tripartite separation of powers, 
or the political principle that governmental policy making 
ought to be subject to control by persons accountable to the 
electorate. Is the trilogy of state powers a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the preservation of liberty, or 
should one rather think in terms of "separated institutions 
sharing power" (Neustadt I960)? As for the political control 
of policy making, one should bear in mind that in Europe 
neither prime ministers or chancellors nor their cabinets are 
directly responsible to the electorate. It is certainly not 
coincidental that similar issues are being raised in the 
ongoing debate about the proper scope of judicial review and 
judicial policy making. The rise of judicial review in Europe 
shows that the triad of government powers is no longer 
considered an inviolable principle. At the same time, courts 
find their policy making role enlarged by the public 
perception of them as guarantors of the substantive ideals of 
democracy when electoral accountability in all spheres of 
government seems to be waning (Volcansek 1992: 5). What 
connects the discourse about administrative regulation with 
that about judicial review and policy making is the issue of 
the role of non-majoritarian institutions in democratic 
societies.
Concerning the regulatory agencies, an important lesson 
from the American experience is that even formal independence 
from executive power (as in the case of the ICRs) does not 




























































































decisions tend to respond to the political preferences of the 
legislators and of the chief executive. Given the variety of 
instruments of control and persuasion available to Congress 
and the president, this finding is not surprising but it does 
challenge the validity of complaints about "a headless fourth 
branch of government". Rather than weak accountability, the 
danger is that the continuity, coherence and expertise of 
regulatory policy making may be compromised by too much 
attention to political expediency.
In addition to congressional and presidential oversight, 
we also noted the role of the courts and of the Administrative 
Procedures Act in defining what constitutes regulatory due 
process. Agencies may make major decisions only after giving 
advance notice through publication in the Federal Register, 
and allowing affected parties to present argument and evidence 
for and against agency proposals. The agency must give reasons 
for its action and publicly present evidence in support of its 
final decision. There must be a separation between those who 
prosecute a case of regulatory violation from those who make 
the decision. Courts may review an agency's decision to 
determine both whether the decision can be objectively 
supported as rational and whether it has been reached through 
fair procedures. The trend now is in the direction of 
substantive, rather than merely procedural, judicial review, 
with the Courts demanding that all significant questions be 




























































































In short, what the American experience teaches us is that 
a highly complex and specialized activity like regulation can 
be monitored and kept politically accountable only by a 
combination of control instruments: legislative and executive 
oversight, strict procedural requirements, public 
participation and, most importantly, substantive judicial 
review. Measured against these standards, regulation in Europe 
is seen to be highly discretionary, suffering from weak 
accountability to Parliament, weak judicial review, absence of 
procedural safeguards, and insufficient public participation 
(Baldwin and McCrudden 1987; Prosser 1989; Veljanovski 1991).
These problems are particularly visible at the EC level 
precisely because of the importance of regulatory policy 
making in the Community system (see section 6). There are 
compelling reasons why member states will continue to delegate 
important regulatory powers to the EC, regardless of the 
progress made toward political union. If national regulators 
were willing and able to take into account the international 
repercussions of their policy choices; if they had perfect 
information of one another's intentions; and if the cost of 
organizing and monitoring policy coordination were negligible, 
international market failures could be managed by a series of 
intergovernmental agreements without the necessity of 
delegating regulatory power to a supranational level. However, 
since these conditions are never satisfied, successful 
coordination of national regulations is extremely difficult.




























































































and interdependent actions without legal force: renegers 
cannot be taken to the European Court of Justice.
Among the many reasons why coordination of national 
regulations is so difficult (Majone 1992a), one deserves 
special attention. As we have seen, regulators need a 
considerable amount of discretion both in rule making and in 
enforcement. Because regulators lack information that only 
regulated firms have, and because governments are reluctant, 
for political reasons, to impose excessive costs on industry, 
bargaining is an essential feature of regulatory enforcement. 
Bargaining being so pervasive, it is extremely difficult for 
an outside observer to determine whether the spirit of an 
intergovernmental regulatory agreement was violated. When it 
is difficult to observe whether states are making an honest 
effort to enforce a cooperative agreement, the agreement is 
not credible. Hence even the limited monitoring capacities of 
the EC Commission make Community regulations more credible 
than intergovernmental agreements.
Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not 
just in the eyes of each other as in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
situation where defecting is the dominant strategy, but in the 
eyes of third parties, such as regulated firms or governments 
outside the Community. For example, where pollution has 
international effects and fines impose significant competitive 
disadvantage on firms that compete internationally, firms are 
likely to believe that national regulators will be unwilling 




























































































enforcement unilaterally rather than under supranational 
supervision. Thus the transfer of regulatory powers to the EC 
Commission, by making more stringent regulation credible, may 
improve the behavior of regulated firms. Also, since the 
Commission is involved in the regulation of a large number of 
firms throughout the Community, it has much more to gain by 
being tough in any individual case than a national regulator: 
weak enforcement would destroy its credibility in the eyes of 
more firms. Thus it may be more willing to enforce sanctions 
than a member state would be, even if its direct costs and 
benefits of doing so are no different (Gatsios and Seabright 
1989: 49-50). The fact that the Commission regulates a large 
number of firms throughout the Community also makes it less 
likely to be captured by a particular firm or industry than a 
national regulator.
For all these reasons the importance of Community 
regulation will continue to increase. Hence, finding solutions 
to the problems of political control and democratic 
accountability of EC policy making becomes even more urgent 
than at the national level. Unfortunately, the usual arguments 
about the democratic deficit of Community institutions fail to 
take into consideration the particular role of the Commission 
as regulator. As our analysis shows, the comparative advantage 
of EC regulation lies in large measure in the relative 
insulation of the "Eurocrats" from the electoral cycles and 
political considerations which dominate national policy 




























































































Commission may be an important safeguard against national and 
sectoral "factionalism". Many of the arguments of the American 
advocates of an independent fourth branch of government (see 
section 5) apply, mutatis mutandis, in the context of the 
European Community and its member states. Hence any proposal 
to improve the democratic legitimacy of European institutions 
should acknowledge the significance of non-majoritarian 
institutions like courts and independent agencies as 
countervailing powers against some of the less attractive 
tendencies of representative democracy. It is also necessary 
to accept the fact that the traditional means of political 
control will not be available for quite some time at Community 
level.
This does not mean, however, that without a radical 
constitutional transformation nothing can be done to improve 
the legitimacy of Community policies. This kind of radicalism 
has been one of the most serious mistakes of the federalist 
movement. Instead, in line with what has been said above about 
the need to use a variety of instruments to discipline 
regulatory discretion, one should approach the control problem 
from different directions. One of the advantages of this 
method is that partial solutions discovered at the Community 
level may be applicable also at the national level where, as 
we saw, the accountability of regulators is still an open 
issue.
As an example of improvements that could be usefully 




























































































clearing house". It will be recalled that the size of 
regulatory programs is not significantly constrained by 
budgetary appropriations, as in the case of direct-expenditure 
programs. This absence of a regulatory budget process is the 
root cause of both economic inefficiency and inadequate 
political oversight. No mechanism exists for regulation that 
requires policy makers throughout the government to solve the 
two-level budget problem —  how much to spend during a given 
period and then how to allocate this total amount among 
alternative uses —  which is addressed by any government in 
its direct-expenditure activities (Litan/Nordhaus 1983). The 
absence of a central political authority in the Community 
further complicates the problem, so that regulatory issues are 
dealt with sector by sector, with little attempt to achieve 
overall policy coherence. Even within the same sector, it 
would be difficult to maintain that regulatory priorities are 
set in a way that explicitly takes into consideration either 
the urgency of the problem, or the benefits and costs of 
different proposals. As I have suggested elsewhere (Majone 
1989b), coordination could be improved by setting up a 
"regulatory clearing house" located at the highest level of 
the Community bureaucracy. Directorates-General (DGs) would be 
asked to submit annually draft regulatory programs for review. 
When disagreements or serious inconsistencies arise, the 
president of the Commission or a "working committee on 
regulation" would be asked to intervene. By extending 




























































































responsible for closely related areas such as environment, 
health and safety at work, consumer protection and food and 
drug regulation, this review process would help the Commission 
shape a consistent set of measures to submit to the Council 
and the Parliament. Simultaneous consideration of all new 
regulations in a given area would also facilitate assessment 
of their joint impact on particular industries and on European 
consumers and the economy as a whole. Similar procedures could 
obviously be introduced also by the member states.
Broader procedural reforms should also be possible. It is 
well known that the Treaty of Rome does not structure the 
executive power of the Community in a single way, applicable 
to all instances of legislation needing further execution. 
Instead, it has been left to the Council, in its capacity as 
legislative decision maker, to organize, case by case, the 
executive process (Lenaerts 1991). This ad hoc approach is the 
very negation of the idea of transparency which plays such a 
large role in the current discussion of regulation. The 
adoption of something like an Administrative Procedures Act 
for the European Community could do more to make public 
accountability possible than the wholesale transfer of 
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